A Partial History
135th Infantry Regiment

34th Infantry Division

Approved for Publication
Allied Force Headquarters
Information News and Censorship Section

THE 135TH IN THE PRESENT WAR (p. 1-33)

MONTAQUILLA AND MOUNT PANTANO (pp. 17-19)

	The 1st Battalion went forward to relieve the 1st Battalion, 168th
[Infantry], on 6 November in the vicinity of Hill 558 and was subjected
to observation and fire from a hill with a familiar number, 609, on the
left flank.  The 3rd Battalion sent patrols north along the Montaquilla
road to the vicinity of Hill 351 and observed Germans occupying Hill 351
at the north of Ravindola gulch.  While establishing communications
across the river 1st Lt. Albert G. Peterson was killed by artillery fire
at the ford.

	On 7 November the 1st Battalion cleared Hill 558 and sent combat
patrols to Hill 520.  From the Regimental CP Capt. Maurice W. Stacy,
S-2, directed fire that blew out two mortar positions on Hill 518.  The
plan for the 2nd Battalion to follow in support of the 1st was changed
and on 8 November a task force under the command of General Caffey,
Assistant Division Commander, was organized.  It consisted of the 135th,
the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 191st Tank Battalion.  The
mission was to secure Montaquilla.  The original plan for again crossing
the Volturno and attacking Montaquilla from the east was abandoned and
plans were made for an attack along the Roccaravindola-Montaquilla
highway.  Mine fields in the valley through this area were reported and
patrols had determined that unimproved roads and trails leading off the
main highway were heavily mined.  On the night of 7-8 November the 3rd
Battalion moved under cover of darkness to the vicinity of Hill 351 and
the 2nd Battalion moved into the vacated 3rd Battalion area prepared to
follow the 3rd at a thousand yards distance, containing Hill 231 on the
left flank with one platoon by mortar and machine-gun fire.  At daylight
the 3rd Battalion attack was preceded by an artillery barrage reinforced
by the fire of TD and Tank Battalions, and by 1600 the 3rd Battalion had
the high ground west of the town.  After daylight broke, the positions
of the TD and Tank Battalions were observed and they received intense
artillery concentrations, but the damage to [equipment] and casualties
were slight.  The shorts fell in the 2nd Battalion area.  The 2nd
Battalion was held up by personnel mines but by 1500 they had passed
through the west side of Montaquilla and had taken positions to the
northwest of the town.  The objective of the 3rd Battalion had been Hill
490 but this prominence however actually controlled no terrain and the
3rd took up positions on Hill 864.  The men repulsed a minor
counter-attack and held on for the night.  During this operation the
enemy appeared to be withdrawing west and north through Filignano after
the defensive positions west of Montaquilla had been taken.  That
evening the 2nd Battalion aid station had a shell burst on a tree limb
directly above and three were killed, twelve wounded.

	On 9 November the 168th again took over the area in the vicinity of
Hill 558 and Hill 609, and the 1st Battalion moved into position at the
mouth of Ravindola gulch to relieve two platoons of the 2nd Battalion. 
The 3rd Battalion was subjected to mortar, machine-gun, and artillery
fire, and the Regimental CP was fired on intermittently, about four
rounds every 15 minutes.  That night a strong enemy patrol broke through
Company L's security, killed the platoon leader, 2nd Lt. Clinton F.
Dailey, and killed or captured 14 men.  The Anti-Tank Company received a
direct hit on one gun but none of the crew was hit.  In 10 November
Montaquilla and the road south of it received three enemy battalion
concentrations and intermittent shelling throughout the night.  This day
and the next two were spent in patrolling north across the Riochiaro and
west toward Mennella and Selvone.  Routes through the mined area were
located by driving sheep and goats ahead and the report of large mine
fields north of Riochiaro was confirmed.  It had been reported by
civilians that the Germans had spent two months mining this area.  The
1st Battalion moved into position on Hill 864 and the 3rd Battalion
organized Hill 635.  On 14 November the 2nd Battalion moved west to the
vicinity of Hill 710 and took up a defensive position outposting the
road from Mennella to Selvone.  This position was precarious because
Hill 1017 to the north and the mass of Hill 1036 to the south dominated
the position and the Battalion was unable to make contact with the 504th
Parachute Regiment supposed to be on Hill 1017.  The Regiment was
ordered to go into a defensive position temporarily, and the Battalions
were echeloned in depth from the outposts to Montaquilla. 
Counter-attack plans, including provision for a possible penetration
into our lines was made.  On 17 November the 2nd Battalion was relieved
by the 1st Battalion and moved back toward Montaquilla.  That same day
the Cannon Company fired 936 rounds on known and suspected targets on
Hill 1100.  The balance of the period to 28 November was devoted to
patrolling and after each four days the front line battalion was pulled
back to Montaquilla and the other battalions moved up to the next
forward position.  At four different times patrols made contact, and on
two occasions prisoners were taken in the town of Mennella.  Two of our
patrols were challenged by German patrols in excellent English.

	The position during the period was strengthened by our own vehicle
and M-3 mines placed by the Mine Platoon of the Anti-Tank Company.  The
Regimental CP on Hill 1036 did some excellent fire direction and made
accurate reports of enemy installations when the weather permitted
observation.  On the 28 November a 30-man patrol from the 1st Battalion
made contact with the Germans on Hill 760 just west of Mennella, and
returned after losing one man in a fire fight.  That day the 81mm
Platoons of the 1st and 3rd Battalions and Cannon Company were to
blanket the crest of Hill 760 and deny the enemy use of the draw west of
Hill 760.  For these supporting fires 1100 rounds of 81mm ammunition had
to be carried by man and mule 6000 yards over a difficult, steep, rocky
mountain trail.  The rate of fire, beginning at 0600 hours, 29 November,
was to be one round of 81mm every six minutes and for the Cannon Company
one round every four minutes, continuing until the fires were masked by
the 168th or lifted on order.  During the operation 1400 rounds of
mortar ammunition and 1500 rounds of 75mm ammunition were fired.  Still,
resistance in front of the 133rd and 168th limited the advance and the
3rd Battalion was alerted for movement via Fozzilli-Filignano or the
Ravindola gulch in support of the 168th.  The 2nd Battalion was attached
to the 168th for emergency deployment.

	During this period, except for the time the 1st Battalion occupied
Hill 558, the assault on Montaquilla by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and
the occupation of the forward positions, the majority of the men had
their bed rolls and hot meals.  The was the first time in either the
Tunisian or Italian campaigns that the Regiment had the assistance of
pack mule trains.  The trails through the mountains, often mined, were
extremely hazardous and difficult.  The recruited mule skinners from the
battalions did good work with this new kind of transportation, in spite
of the fact that mule shoe nails and pack equipment were extremely
difficult to obtain.  The mule skinners, on several occasions, led and
controlled the animals through heavy shell fire and prevented the loss
of valuable cargoes of food and ammunition.  At one time the peak of the
mule strength was 74 and at that time 45 of them were "non-combatants"
because of the lack of mule show nails.  Communication lines were
extended and of necessity followed the mule trails closely.  Signal
equipment had to be packed over the hills, and sharp mule hooves and
sliding men and mules on the slippery trail often took out our own lines

	It was impossible to secure socks until the end of the month and
considerable foot trouble resulted.  The battalions coming out of the
Mennella-Selvone area evacuated 40 men in 24 hours for various degrees
and stages of trench foot.

	During this month increasing use was made of the Cannon Company
which fired a total of 2361 rounds.

	Two officers and 17 enlisted men, the first to be selected under the
rotation plan, calling for one-half on one per cent per month of the
Regiment, left for home on 21 November.

	By 1 December the 135th was in Division reserve near Montaquilla,
and the 133rd was preparing to attack Cerasulo on the right, and the
168th Hill 1100, otherwise known as Mt. Pantano.  The 2nd Battalion,
135th, reinforced with additional mortars from the Regiment, supported
the Division attack from positions on the high ground to the east of the
extending north and south line between Selvone and Mennella.

	At 0800 hours, 1 December, the attack opened following a 30-minute
artillery preparation, but intense fire from the enemy, including heavy
artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, plus a large number of personnel
mines, prevented the two Regiments from attaining their objectives.  The
enemy counter-attacked fiercely and prisoners confirmed the presence of
the 577th Infantry Regiment, 305th Division, in the 168th sector.  On 3
December General Ryder ordered Company E, 135th, to move to Hill 760,
relieving a company of the 168th and becoming attached to that Regiment.
During the night of 4-5 December the 135th relieved the 168th on Hill
1100, the 3rd Battalion occupying the north sector with Company E
reverting back to its own Regiment.  The 1st Battalion marched over a
trail to take over the south sector of the hill, and the 2nd Battalion
went into Regimental reserve near Colemacchia[?].  Company D, 2nd
Chemical Battalion, formerly attached to the 168th, was attached to the
135th.  The Cannon Company was in a position to support the Regiment and
performed an excellent job with its harassing and interdictory fire. 
This finally provoked the enemy into retaliation with heavy
concentrations of counter-battery, but the fire failed to silence the
75mm pack howitzers.

	For the next several days there was heavy mortar and artillery fire
from both sides with a considerable number of casualties.  The task of
the litter bearers was a difficult one, for it took as long as four
hours to bring the wounded off Mt. Pantano.  Trench foot continued to
plague the men.  On 8 December the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st
Battalion, and the Anti-Tank Company was given the responsibility of the
2nd Battalion, which went into reserve, of patrolling the main road at
Cerreto.

	The 34th Division was relieved by the 2nd Moroccan Division on 10-11
December, and the Regiment left for an assembly area at S. Angelo
d'Alife on 12 December.  Colonel Ward, who remained with the French for
24 hours after the relief had been completed, was visited by Col.
Maumier con Droyer, commanding officer of the regiment the 135th relived
in February, 1943, at Pichon, Tunisia.