A Partial History
135th Infantry Regiment

34th Infantry Division

Approved for Publication
Allied Force Headquarters
Information News and Censorship Section

THE 135TH IN THE PRESENT WAR (p. 1-33)

THE ANZIO BEACHHEAD (pp. 24-25)

	The first few days at S. Angelo d'Alife were spent in resting,
cleaning up, and taking showers.  Training of one and one-half hours
daily started 17 February and continued until the Regiment moved to a
new area at Calore.  On 6 March Lt. Col Harry W. Sweeting assumed
command of the Regiment, succeeding Lt. Col Charles B. Everest who had
taken over command when Col. Ward was wounded.  Replacements were
received and the training program was expanded to include night
problems, combat firing, and schools for communication and intelligence
personnel.

	The move to the Anzio beachhead started with the Regiment going by
truck to a staging area at Bagnoli near Naples.  The troops, making an
uneventful journey by LSTs, arrived in the harbor of Anzio on 23-24
March.  There was some enemy shellfire.  Col. Sweeting and the Battalion
Commanders had left on 20 March for a reconnaissance of the beachhead. 
The men had been impressed with the necessity of digging in, and needed
no reminder when they experienced air raids and heard heavy seige gun
shells from the enemy in the staging area in the vicinity of Nettuno. 
Falling flak from anti-aircraft guns was a menace both here and in later
positions on the beachhead.  By 27 March we had taken over the position
occupied by the 7th Infantry [Regiment], 3rd [Infantry] Division.  The
1st and 3rd Battalions were on the line approximately five kilometers
southwest of Cisterna di Littora; and the 2nd Battalion, Anti-Tank and
Cannon Companies, and Regimental Headquarters were grouped around Campo
Morto and the vicinity to the northeast.  The 168th Infantry was on the
right flank and with the relief of the 3rd Division completed on 29
March.  The 157th Infantry [Regiment] of the 45th [Infantry] Division
was on the left

	The defensive period of the Anzio beachhead was one in which the men
were forced to remain in foxholes and dugouts throughout the day. 
Movement in the rear was covered by smoke.  At night activity on our
part as well as that of the Germans consisted largely of aggressive
patrolling and sending out raiding parties.  Artillery fire was heavy
and concentrated, and at night the Germans made much use of
self-propelled guns, while in turn we brought up tanks for direct and
indirect firing.  Col. Sweeting made frequent reconnaissance trips in
the Field Artillery Cubs to observe the enemy and to check on the
concealment of our positions, all of which were under direct observation
[by] the enemy on the high ground of the beachhead periphery.  The
defensive situation continued through 27 April and there was no
slackening in the constant exchange of artillery, mortar, tank, and
small-arms fire, as well as almost nightly air raids by the Germans. 
Rocket guns also were used by the enemy.  Illustrative of the shelling
from the enemy were the events on 13 April when all Battalion areas were
shelled throughout a 24-hour period, and the average number of rounds
coming in at one time numbering between 12 and 20 rounds.  Forty rounds
landed in the vicinity of the 2nd Battalion CP, and the area held by
Company F was bombed from the air at the same time.  On 16 April four
men were killed and seven wounded at the same CP, and later in the day a
50-round concentration killed three men.  The enemy also fired
propaganda leaflets.

	Patrolling and raiding continued and on 26 April the 3rd Battalion
executed "Charlie" Plan, a tank and infantry raid on House "Y" in the
sector.  It was carried out by one platoon of infantry and supported by
five tanks.  Jumping off at 0540, one tank threw a track and could not
be used.  The other four tanks passed through Company K wire which had
been cut, and moved out on the left boundary guided by tape laid out by
the engineers.  One tank turned right to take up the base of fire and
the other three tanks proceeded forward and opened fire with .30 and .50
caliber machine guns and 75mm cannon on the house.  One of the three
tanks struck a shell crater, bogged down, and managed to pull out.  A
second tank ran into wire 50 yards from the house and after an advance
of 10 yards was incapacitated by an anti-tank mine.  As the platoon
arrived at the house enemy mortar shells started falling.  With the
tanks giving overhead support, the house was entered, two Germans killed
and six captured, and the raiding party withdrew.

	The relief of the 135th Infantry by the 168th started on 27 April
and was completed on the last day of the month.  The move put the
Anti-tank Company and the 2nd Battalion in the vicinity north of Tre
Cancelli, the 1st and 2nd Battalions near Campo Morto, Cannon Company
and the 3rd Battalion northeast of Burgo Montello, and the Regimental
Headquarters just south of Le Ferriere.

ROME (pp. 25-28)

	On 11 May 1944, II Corps of the Fifth Army began the first major
phase of the drive for the liberation of Rome.  The II Corps succeeded
in breaking through the enemy's "Gustav" and "Hitler" Lines and set the
stage for the VI Corps of the Fifth Army on the Anzio beachhead to
initiate the second major phase of the operation.  On D-Day 23 May VI
Corps attacked as planned in operation "Buffalo"  This operation called
for the breaking up of the hostile defenses around the beachhead
perimeter, the destruction of the enemy forces manning these defenses,
and the securing of an "X-Y" line curving around Cisterna on the north
and east of the town, thereby cutting Highway 7 and denying the enemy
use of this highway to supply his troops opposing II Corps.  After this
had been accomplished, Plan "Buffalo" called for the establishment of a
"C-B" Line from which an attack could be launched toward Velletri.  The
135th Infantry was attached to CCA [Combat Command A] of the 1st Armored
[Division] for the execution of Plan "Buffalo".  The plan of attack for
CCA was divided into three phases: Phase 1, the securing of a "Brown
Line" a short distance above the Cisterna-Albano railroad; Phase 2, the
securing of a "Green Line" above Highway 7; and Phase 3, the securing of
a "Red Line" below Velletri.

	At 0630, 23 May, the tanks and infantry crossed the line of
departure following a tremendous 35-minute artillery barrage, and after
four "snakes" had been detonated.  The "snakes" were being used for the
first time and created havoc among the enemy as a result of the terrible
explosion caused by its 352-foot long metal casing filled with
approximately 1400 pounds of explosive charge.  The Regiment was
attacking initially with the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2nd
Battalion on the right, and the 3rd Battalion in reserve.  Enemy
reaction to the attack was varied in intensity across the zone of
action.  The element of surprise had been gained, the element of shock
was established.  Very effective support was given by the [Air Force] in
the initial stage, and this aided greatly in establishing shock.

	The 1st Battalion had trouble with mines which tended to hold up
their advance; the 2nd Battalion made good headway although enemy
opposition gradually stiffened.  Casualties were light and 257 prisoners
were taken by 1635.  The operation proceeded according to plan and the
railroad track was taken at 1700.  In this action CCA lost five light
tanks and four medium tanks but success was complete and in addition to
taking many prisoners the Regiment had inflicted heavy casualties on the
Germans.  Prisoners, when interrogated, said the attack came as a
complete surprise as they had expected it at dawn and many of them had
gone to sleep in their caves and were overrun.  The German practice had
been to remain alert all night for a dawn attack and then sleep in the
day with a few sentries posted.  Some who had fought in Russia said they
had never experienced so powerful an artillery concentration.

	Two enlisted men of Company B gave such demonstrations of courage
and initiative in this attack that they were later awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor, and one was commissioned as a result of
his exploits.  They were Staff Sergeant George G. Hall and Technical
Sergeant Ernest H. Dervishian, the latter commissioned a 2nd lieutenant.

	Shortly after the jump-off Company B was pinned down by grazing fire
from three machine guns.  Sergeant Hall set out alone, taking advantage
of slight depressions and shellholes, and from a distance of fifty yards
hurled four hand grenades into the first enemy gun emplacement.  Two
Germans were killed and four others surrendered, and Hall turned his
attention to the second gun.  Exhausting his own grenades, he picked up
some German "potato mashers" and killed five members of the crew.  Five
more surrendered.  As Sergeant Hall crawled forward toward the third
gun, an artillery shell exploded and severed his right leg.  With the
two guns out of action, the Company flanked the third gun and continued
its advance.

	Sergeant Dervishian's exploits took place near the Cisterna- Albano
railroad embankment where his platoon by aggressive action had advanced
far ahead of the balance of the Company.  Sergeant Dervishian and four
other men captured 25 Germans by the railroad embankment and proceeded
on, after sending the Germans to the rear, to a vineyard where
Dervishian went ahead to capture six Germans after his group had wounded
three of the enemy.  Moving through the vineyard, machine-gun fire
pinned the men down, and Sergeant Dervishian ordered them to make their
way to the rear while he worked his way forward within hand grenade
range of the gun.  He grasped his opportunity when the gun ceased firing
at him, took the four-man crew prisoners with the use of grenades and
his carbine, sent them to the rear, and started after a second machine
gun.  This gun crew had observed Sergeant Dervishian's men moving
forward again and had killed one and wounded another.  Sergeant
Dervishian turned the captured enemy gun on the second machine gun. 
This crew, too, surrendered, and picking up a German machine pistol
Dervishian captured the crew of a third gun 25 yards to his right.  In
all, the Company B sergeant captured 39 prisoners and knocked out three
machine guns.

	After taking the first objective on the railroad track to the west
of Cisterna, the Regiment reorganized and prepared to defend the ground
gained while awaiting orders for its further commitment.  In this
defensive position the Battalions were subjected to heavy artillery and
mortar fire which pinned the troops down and disrupted communications. 
Local counter-attacks were beaten off by both the 1st and 2nd
Battalions.  In the meantime the 3rd Battalion was committed on the
right flank of the Regimental sector.  Mopping up continued through 25
May and patrols were sent out to destroy abandoned enemy anti-tank guns
and artillery pieces.  The Cannon Company reported that one of their
guns had been knocked out during the operations, and the 1st Battalion
recorded the loss of its Communications Officer, its S-2, S-3, and three
Company Commanders in the first hours of the attack.

	At 1100 26 May the Regiment less the 3rd Battalion, reverted to 34th
Division control and passed into Division reserve.  The 3rd Battalion
remained attached to CCA and rejoined the Regiment on the night of 26
May.  The Regiment was assigned as Division reserve.

	General Ryder informed Col. Sweeting that aerial reconnaissance
showed the enemy to be withdrawing along the entire front, and added
that the [Air Force] was engaged in bombing and strafing German columns
along the road with severe casualties to men and damage to vehicles.  As
a result of the initial success, for which the Regiment was highly
complimented by General Harmon, Commander of the 1st Armored Division,
the Germans had nothing more than the remains of the 362nd Infantry
Division to defend their sector to the front of the 34th Division.  To
meet the crisis they shifted the reserve elements of the 4th Parachute
Division, 65th Infantry Division, and the 3rd Grenadier Panzer Division
to this sector, and weakened their positions on the north of the
beachhead.  On 27 May the 2nd Battalion was detached from the Regiment
and attached to CCA, 1st Armored Division.

	The 100th Battalion was attached to the Regiment to replace the 2nd
Battalion.  While the Regiment remained in Division reserve, the 133rd
and 168th Infantry Regiments kept pressure on the enemy and forced them
back to their main line of resistance paralleling the railroad from
Lanuvio to Velletri.  Here the enemy, strong and determined, succeeded
in holding up elements of the Division.  Added weight was needed.  Dawn
of 31 May found the Regiment again committed to the attack.  Preceded by
a thirty-minute artillery preparation, the Regiment attacked along a
narrow zone of action between the 45th Division and the 133rd Infantry. 
The 3rd Battalion was on the left and the 1st Battalion on the right,
with the 100th Battalion in reserve.  At the outset, the 1st Battalion
was pinned down by heavy enemy fire and did not move forward for several
days.

	The 3rd Battalion inched forward through intense mortar,
machine-gun, and artillery fire over rolling open wheat fields and
vineyards toward the Colli Lasiali.  Their flanks were open to enemy
fire and a friendly artillery barrage fell on the Battalion which was
unable to halt it due to lack of communication.  The enemy with his
accurately placed mortars inflicted great damage on the Battalion in the
area of Pastarella Creek, and one gully, filled with dead and wounded,
was named "Bloody Gulch".  The Medical Detachment, under Captain Charles
W. Mills, performed heroic work in the treatment of several hundred
casualties, including men from other battalions.  The Germans
continually sniped at the aid men, despite their Red Cross insignia. 
The 3rd Battalion drove on in a series of assaults with grenades and
bayonets and routed the enemy from two strongpoints protected by barbed
wire and consisting of numerous machine-gun emplacements connected by a
trench system which included shell-proof dugouts.  A sector of the
enemy's Lanuvio line was in possession of the Battalion as darkness
fell.

	The next morning, 1 June, the 3rd Battalion resumed the attack and
an 800-yard advance was made in the face of intensified enemy fire to a
road leading into Lanuvio.  Because of the inability of the units on the
flanks to come abreast and the difficulty of obtaining supporting
artillery fire through lack of observation, the Battalion was ordered to
withdraw at 1900.  Scarcely had the withdrawal been carried out than
each Company of the Battalion was attacked by a force of enemy in
battalion strength supported by a platoon of tanks.  Relentlessly, the
Germans hurled waves of counter-attacks against the Battalion, but not a
foot was yielded, at the cost of 264 killed and wounded.  The known dead
of the enemy were over 400.  Thirteen battalions of artillery were
brought to bear against the elite German troops.

	The valor of the individual Infantryman lengthened the long roll of
honor of the Regiment.

	The squad of which Private Furman L. Smith, Company L, was a member,
knocked out two enemy machine guns, killed eight and captured 18.  Then
80 Germans armed with automatic weapons charged.  First the Company
pulled back, then the platoon, but Smith and two wounded
non-commissioned officers remained.  Smith, dragging his wounded
comrades to the shelter of a shellhole, stood erect before the advancing
Germans and fired clip after clip of ammunition from his rifle.  The
enemy wavered, then pressed forward, and Smith fell dead with his rifle
at his shoulder.  The Company, inspired by the courage and devotion to
duty of this lone man, rallied and beat back the foe.  The Congressional
Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously to Private Smith.

	Staff Sergeant David Lopez of the same Company, using a Tommy gun
[Thompson Sub-Machine Gun], crawled across an open field, killed five
Germans and destroyed two machine-gun positions.  One of his legs was
shattered and he was taken prisoner.  Although he suffered great pain,
he observed enemy positions, and when he was recaptured by the men of
his Company he was able to provide valuable information on the enemy's
strength and positions.  Sergeant Lopez was awarded the Distinguished
Service Cross.

	Private Francis J. Laurain, a runner with Company K, saw some of the
men withdrawing and he left the Company Command Post, rallied them and
led the group through an intense barrage of mortar and machine-gun fire
to the former positions.  Private Laurain, posthumously awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross, was killed while firing his rifle,

	With the enemy strength centered against the 3rd Battalion, the
battalions on each flank were able to move forward on 2 June.  The 100th
Battalion passed through the 3rd and advanced well into the hills toward
Albano.  The 2nd Battalion, ready to attack, received a note from the
enemy asking for a truce to remove the dead.  It was ignored and the
attack was launched.  Tank support for the 2nd Battalion arrived late
and the armor was unable to progress because of anti-tank fire. 
Germans, who had [infiltrated] into burned-out tanks during the night,
placed accurate fire on the infantry, and enemy tanks moved forward but
were repulsed by our tanks who came up to smash the formation.  It was
learned from prisoners [in] transport and storm battalions and engineer
units that the enemy had orders to withdraw about three kilometers at
2400 hours, and this evidence seemed confirmed when a small-scale
counter-attack was launched, apparently as a covering movement, shortly
before that hour.  The 133rd Infantry entered Lanuvio early on the day
of 3 June to find that the Germans had withdrawn.

	The Regiment suffered a hard loss on the same morning when Lt. Col.
Ray J. Ericksen and two enlisted men were killed while on reconnaissance
with Col. Sweeting.  Col. Ericksen, who had played a leading role in the
Regimental fighting in Italy, was awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross posthumously.

	On the evening of 4 June the enemy had pulled out all along the
Regimental front and the Battalions swung over to an area near Albano
and prepared to march to Rome along Highway 7.  The only enemy
resistance was limited to occasional fire from self-propelled and
anti-tanks guns in support of small groups of infantrymen left behind to
fight a delaying action.

	On 5 June the 135th Infantry entered the first of the Axis capitals
and was the first Infantry unit to march into the limits of Rome.  The
CP of the 1st Battalion was established in Rome at 0130, and the troops
continued to press through and beyond the city with tanks.  The 3rd
Battalion, following Armored units, moved into Rome and occupied a park
on the south bank of the Tiber River at 0730.  The civilian population
of the "Eternal City" lined the streets, throwing flowers and fruit to
the troops and embracing and kissing the men.  Because of this emotional
welcome, the movement of vehicles and foot soldiers was slow.  Our
infantrymen were footsore, dusty, and weary, but the greeting of a
liberated people helped greatly in reviving their spirits.  The
Regimental Command Post was established in the Majestic Hotel on 5 June.

	On the same day at 1430, it was reported that Col. Sweeting and his
driver, Private Eugene G. Grimm, were missing in action.  Their vehicle
had been found knocked out.  Some months later both were reported
prisoners of war in Germany.  Lt. Col. Charles P. Greyer assumed command
of the Regiment.

	The 1st and 3rd Battalions, attached to CCB [Combat Command B, 1st
Armored Division], followed the general direction of Highway 2, drove
hard against the enemy rear guard, and by 8 June had covered 40 miles
from Rome and reached Viterbo.